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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a simple multiplicative decomposition that can help in comparing the 
levels of mortgage interest tax deductions observed in different states or areas, and some of the 
reasons leading to different levels of deductions. The key parameters in the decomposition are a 
state’s population, its number of tax filers, the share of filers claiming a specific deduction, the 
average taxes paid by filers, and the average deduction among claimants. The idea is that such 
simple decompositions can be useful for states and local authorities to better understand some of 
the reasons why they may have comparatively high or low deductions in their state, and whether 
the levels of deductions observed are as one might have expected given their overall tax receipts.  
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1. Introduction 
 
About a third of US taxpayers choose to itemize their deductions rather than claim the 
standard deduction. Tax payers with a higher adjusted gross income are much more likely to 
itemize and among itemized deductions, the deduction for mortgage interest is by far the largest, 
expected to amount to 6.5 percent ($71.1 billion) of annual federal tax expenditures in fiscal year 
2014 (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2013)2. This compares to 4.7 percent ($51.8 billion) of 
federal tax expenditure for the local and state tax deduction, 3.9 percent ($43.6 million) for the 
charitable deduction, and 2.6 percent for the real estate taxes deduction ($28.6 million). The 
mortgage interest deduction is at the federal level the fourth largest overall tax expenditure after 
the exclusion of employer contributions for health care, health insurance premiums, and long-
term care insurance premiums. Even after accounting for incentive effects whereby households 
would reduce their mortgage debt in the absence of the deduction, the tax revenues that would be 
generated by a repeal of the deduction would be very large (Poterba and Sinai, 2011).  
Itemized deductions have substantial costs in terms of foregone tax revenues not only at 
the federal level, but also at the state and local levels. In the case of the District of Columbia 
which is discussed in more details as a case study in this paper, Juffras (2013) distinguishes 
between three types of tax expenditures: those mandated by local law, those provided to other 
governments by virtue of the District’s unique role as the country’s capital city (this includes for 
example tax breaks to embassies, government agencies, and multilateral organizations), and 
those related to conformity of the tax code with federal provisions. In that last category, the 
home mortgage interest deduction was in fiscal year 2012 the third largest tax expenditure ($87.0 
million) after employer contributions for medical insurance and medical care ($109.4 million) 
and employer pension contributions and earnings plans ($90.7 million). While tax expenditures 
for mortgage interest deductions of $87.0 million may seem low in comparison to the total of 
$2.9 billion in tax expenditures for the District, it is still a substantial investment. 
The mortgage interest deduction originated in 1913 from a general provision allowing a 
deduction for all interest in individual tax returns, but as noted by Ventry (2011) it is not clear 
that Congress meant the deduction to offset part of the cost of home ownership. Researchers as 
well as critiques of the deduction have pointed out repeatedly that most of its benefits go to the 
upper segments of the distribution of income who might not need them (e.g., Poterba, 1992; 
Follain, Ling, and McGill, 1993; for more recent estimates, see among others Cole, Gee, and 
Turner, 2011; Hanson, 2012). The regressivity of the mortgage interest deduction results in part 
from the progressivity of marginal income tax rates which generates larger breaks for higher 
income households with larger mortgages. But it also results from the possibility of opting for 
the standard deduction among low and middle class families for whom the mortgage deduction 
may not bring additional benefits because the amount of interest they pay is too low.  
Given its size and its regressivity, it is not surprising that the mortgage interest deduction 
has been at the center of recent discussions of tax reforms.  In 2005, President Bush’s Advisory 
                                                          
2 In the year for which data are used in this paper, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated the tax relief 
provided by the mortgage interest deduction to be $91 billion. The concept of tax expenditure was initially 
introduced in 1967 by Assistant Treasury Secretary Stanley Surrey and later defined more precisely by the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as follows: “Revenue losses attributable to provisions of the … tax laws which 
allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a 
preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability” (quote reproduced from Juffras, 2013). 
 
3 
 
Panel on Tax Reform recommended to limit the mortgage interest deduction to 15 percent of the 
interest paid, while Domenici and Rivlin (2010) proposed to cap the mortgage interest deduction 
at $25,000. Various assessments (many on-going) have been undertaken to estimate the costs and 
benefits for various parties of these and other proposals (e.g., Cole et al., 2011; Poterba and 
Sinai, 2011; Gravelle and Lowry, 2013; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013). Regional politics play a 
role in these policy discussions not only as matters of principle, but also because not all states 
stand to gain or lose equally. Apart from being concentrated in upper income brackets, the 
benefits from the mortgage interest deduction also tend to be higher in ‘blue’ states (Sullivan, 
2011), including California and major cities of the Mid-Atlantic region, from Washington, DC, 
to Boston (e.g., Gyourko and Sinai, 2003, 2004). Spatial differences in benefits from the 
deduction are large as demonstrated in a recent report by the Pew Charitable Trusts (2013), and 
they relate to differences in demography and income levels, as well as to differences in home 
prices and state and local income and property taxes (Brady et al., 2003).  
This paper is also about geographic disparities in the mortgage interest deduction. Its 
objective is to provide a simple multiplicative decomposition that helps in comparing the levels 
of mortgage interest tax deductions observed in different states or areas, and some of the reasons 
leading to different levels of deductions. The idea is that such simple decompositions can be 
useful for states and other local authorities to better understand some of the reasons why they 
may have comparatively high or low deductions in their state, and whether these levels of 
deductions are as one might have expected given their overall tax receipts. Apart from the 
decomposition, simple graphical visualizations are used to provide a rough assessment as to 
whether the parameter values for the various factors contributing to observed levels of mortgage 
interest tax deduction appear to be as one might have expected in various states. On purpose, the 
analysis is carried in such a way that it can be easily replicated for many other itemized 
deductions apart from the mortgage interest deduction considered for the illustration.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the decomposition.  Section 3 
provides the results of the decomposition as applied to the levels of mortgage interest deductions 
per person observed by state.  Those levels are decomposed into a number of factors contributing 
to them – namely a state’s share of the population that files tax returns, the share of filers who 
claim the mortgage interest deduction, the average taxes paid by filers, and the average mortgage 
interest deduction among claimants. Section 4 visualizes differences between states in the 
parameters of the decomposition through simple graphs that help to assess whether some states 
are outliers in terms of the decomposition’s parameter values.  The discussion focuses on the 
case of the District of Columbia for illustrative purposes. A brief conclusion follows.  
 
 
2. Decomposition 
 
Define the total amount of mortgage interest deductions in a state by TD, which stands 
for total deductions. If P is the population of the state, F is the number of income tax filers, D is 
the number of filers who claim a mortgage interest deduction, AT is the average federal tax paid 
by filers, and AD|D is the average mortgage interest deduction claimed among those filers who 
claim a mortgage interest deduction, the following accounting identity holds: 
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In equation (1), the first term in bracket is simply the number of individuals who claim 
the mortgage tax deduction, and the second term is the average deduction claimed among 
claimants. The use of the conditional symbol “|” simply underscores the fact that for the last term 
in the decomposition, the average mortgage interest deduction is estimated among filers with a 
mortgage interest deduction and not among all filers. For comparisons between states, given that 
there are large differences in population between the various states, it makes more sense to 
compare mortgage interest deductions per capita, which are denoted by PCD, with: 
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Since the decomposition is multiplicative, for small enough changes, the proportional 
change over time in deductions between two states i and j or between any state i and a reference 
state or the United States as a whole (or alternatively all other states apart from the state being 
considered) can be approximated in additive terms. Considering the case of comparisons 
between an individual state i and the United States as a whole, one has:  
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The potential usefulness of the decomposition is that it highlights four different factors 
that may affect differences deductions per person between states: differences between the shares 
of the population that file, differences in the shares of filers claiming a mortgage interest tax 
deduction, differences in the average taxes paid by filers, and differences in the average 
deductions of filers among those who deduct as a proportion of the average taxes paid by filers. 
Note that while in this paper we consider average taxes paid AT as a parameter in the 
decomposition, other normalizing factors could be used as well, such as average income.  
Although this is not done in this paper, the same decomposition could be used to 
decompose changes over time in mortgage interest deductions within any given state. In that case 
it could make more sense to look at total deductions for a state as opposed to deductions per 
capita, and this would yield a fifth term in equation (2) that would account for changes in the 
population of the state over time. The decomposition can also be used to look at the sources of 
difference between income groups in deduction levels, although this is also not done here to keep 
the paper short and focused.  
 
 
3. Results 
The decomposition was estimated using data on itemized tax deductions for mortgage 
interest by state for the year 2010. The population data is from the 2010 census. The estimates of 
the number of tax filers, itemizers, the amount of taxes paid, and the deductions claimed for 
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mortgage interest are obtained through simple computational manipulations from the data 
provided in the statistical appendix of the report compiled by Pew Charitable Trusts (2013).  
Table 1 presents the key results. The first column provides the amount of mortgage 
interest deductions by state in US$ millions. The second column provides the deductions per 
capita. The third column gives the share of the population that files a tax return, while the fourth 
column gives the share of filers who itemize the mortgage interest deduction. The next column 
provides the average taxes paid by filer in the state, and the following column gives the ratio of 
the average mortgage interest deduction claimed (among claimants) divided by the average taxes 
paid by filers. All these variables are used in equations (1) and (2). Finally, the last sets of 
columns give the proportional differences between a state and the average for the United States 
in the key variables, which corresponds to differences in logarithms as expressed in equation (3). 
There are large differences in the variables used for the decomposition between states. 
The average mortgage interest deduction claimed ranges from $516 in West Virginia to $2,211 
in Maryland. The number of filers as a share of a state’s population ranges from 41.1 percent in 
Utah to 53.7 percent in the District of Columbia, while the share of tax filers deducting mortgage 
interest ranges from only 15.0 percent in West Virginia and North Dakota to 36.8 percent in 
Maryland. The average tax paid per filer ranges from $1,192 in North Dakota to $4,580 in 
Maryland, and the ratio of the average mortgage interest deduction among claimants divided by 
the average taxes paid among filers ranges from 2.72 in Maryland to 6.67 in West Virginia. It is 
clear from these few cases that there is an inverse relationship between some of the parameters. 
For example, states that have lower incomes and thereby lower amounts of taxes paid per person 
tend to have lower shares of filers who itemize, and a higher average ratio of the mortgage 
deduction among claimants to the average taxes paid by filers (this is because in poorer states 
deductions tend to be concentrated even more than elsewhere in the upper income groups).  
In order to see how the decomposition (2) and the resulting additive decomposition in 
growth rates (3) work, consider the last state in the table, Wyoming. The total mortgage interest 
deductions for the state were at $581 million in 2010, and the average deduction per person 
(inhabitant) was $1.031. This compares to $1266 for the United States, so that the proportional 
difference between the two values is -18.6 percent (that is, -0.186 = (1,031-1266)/1266). This is 
approximated in the “Comparisons” part of table 1 by the difference in logarithms indicated in 
the column “TD/P”, which takes a value of -0.20. That difference in logarithms is itself the sum 
of four differences, as expressed in equation (3): the difference in the share of the population that 
files (value of 0.05), the difference in the share of filers who itemize (-0.23), the difference in the 
average taxes paid by filers (-0.26), and the difference in the average deduction among filers who 
itemize divided by the average tax paid by filers (0.23). In other words, while Wyoming has a 
lower share of filers who itemize the mortgage deduction, this is compensated by a larger 
average deduction among claimants as a share of the average taxes paid among filers. If one 
controls for these two offsetting factors in the decomposition, the fact that average taxes paid in 
Wyoming are substantially lower than in the United States accounts for much of the difference in 
total mortgage deductions per person between the state and the national average. 
The fact that any given state may have a high or low level of mortgage interest 
deductions per person in comparison to the average for the United States does not however mean 
that the state is necessarily an outlier given the state’s characteristics. In order to explain why 
this is the case, apart from providing the decomposition, it is also useful to visualize its various 
parameters graphically. This is done in Section 4 to provide additional intuition – in the form of a 
basic visual diagnostic – as to whether some states are outliers for specific parameter values.   
6 
 
Table 1: Decomposition of Mortgage Interest Tax Deductions by State, 2010 
   Levels Comparisons (differences in logs) 
State TD 
($ million) 
TD/P 
($) 
F/P 
(%) 
D/F 
(%) 
AT 
($) 
AD|D/AT 
 
TD/P 
(%) 
F/P 
(%) 
D/F 
(%) 
AT 
(%) 
AD|D/AT 
(%) 
Alabama 4052 848 44.0 22.4 1927 4.47 -0.40 -0.06 -0.13 -0.34 0.13 
Alaska 903 1,271 52.6 21.7 2415 4.60 0.00 0.12 -0.16 -0.12 0.16 
Arizona 8602 1,359 43.0 28.0 3164 3.57 0.07 -0.08 0.10 0.15 -0.10 
Arkansas 1783 611 42.0 18.8 1456 5.33 -0.73 -0.11 -0.31 -0.62 0.31 
California 71918 1,930 44.8 27.4 4311 3.65 0.42 -0.04 0.07 0.46 -0.07 
Colorado 9124 1,814 47.1 32.8 3850 3.05 0.36 0.01 0.25 0.35 -0.25 
Connecticut 6497 1,818 48.3 34.3 3761 2.92 0.36 0.04 0.30 0.33 -0.30 
Delaware 1417 1,578 47.6 30.6 3312 3.26 0.22 0.02 0.18 0.20 -0.18 
District of Columbia 1222 2,030 53.7 25.3 3784 3.96 0.47 0.14 -0.01 0.33 0.01 
Florida 20893 1,111 51.2 19.4 2169 5.15 -0.13 0.09 -0.27 -0.22 0.27 
Georgia 11981 1,237 47.4 27.2 2610 3.67 -0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.07 
Hawaii 2281 1,677 48.0 23.3 3491 4.28 0.28 0.03 -0.09 0.25 0.09 
Idaho 1719 1,096 42.3 27.4 2591 3.65 -0.14 -0.10 0.07 -0.05 -0.07 
Illinois 16570 1,291 47.1 27.5 2742 3.64 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.08 
Indiana 5270 813 46.0 22.8 1767 4.39 -0.44 -0.01 -0.11 -0.43 0.11 
Iowa 2453 805 46.0 24.4 1752 4.10 -0.45 -0.01 -0.04 -0.44 0.04 
Kansas 2470 866 45.8 24.1 1890 4.15 -0.38 -0.02 -0.06 -0.36 0.06 
Kentucky 3353 773 42.8 23.9 1806 4.18 -0.49 -0.09 -0.06 -0.41 0.06 
Louisiana 3186 703 43.9 17.8 1601 5.63 -0.59 -0.06 -0.36 -0.53 0.36 
Maine 1331 1,002 47.1 25.7 2129 3.90 -0.23 0.01 0.01 -0.24 -0.01 
Maryland 12766 2,211 48.3 36.8 4580 2.72 0.56 0.03 0.37 0.52 -0.37 
Massachusetts 11437 1,747 48.9 31.4 3571 3.18 0.32 0.05 0.21 0.27 -0.21 
Michigan 9978 1,010 46.6 26.0 2166 3.84 -0.23 0.00 0.02 -0.23 -0.02 
Minnesota 8184 1,543 48.3 32.7 3195 3.05 0.20 0.03 0.25 0.16 -0.25 
Mississippi 1686 568 43.3 17.2 1314 5.82 -0.80 -0.08 -0.40 -0.73 0.40 
Missouri 5577 931 44.9 24.9 2074 4.02 -0.31 -0.04 -0.02 -0.27 0.02 
Montana 999 1,010 48.0 23.4 2104 4.26 -0.23 0.03 -0.08 -0.25 0.08 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
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Table 1 (Continued): Decomposition of Mortgage Interest Tax Deductions by State, 2010 
   Levels Comparisons (differences in logs) 
State TD 
($ million) 
TD/P 
($) 
F/P 
(%) 
D/F 
(%) 
AT 
($) 
AD|D/AT 
 
TD/P 
(%) 
F/P 
(%) 
D/F 
(%) 
AT 
(%) 
AD|D/AT 
(%) 
Nebraska 1520 832 46.8 23.8 1780 4.20 -0.42 0.00 -0.07 -0.42 0.07 
Nevada 3792 1,404 46.8 24.6 3001 4.06 0.10 0.00 -0.04 0.10 0.04 
New Hampshire 2055 1,561 50.4 30.3 3095 3.30 0.21 0.08 0.17 0.13 -0.17 
New Jersey 15717 1,788 48.7 32.1 3667 3.11 0.35 0.04 0.23 0.30 -0.23 
New Mexico 1887 916 44.3 21.0 2067 4.77 -0.32 -0.05 -0.20 -0.27 0.20 
New York 22724 1,173 47.8 23.0 2451 4.34 -0.08 0.03 -0.10 -0.10 0.10 
North Carolina 10714 1,124 44.1 28.2 2549 3.55 -0.12 -0.06 0.10 -0.06 -0.10 
North Dakota 394 586 49.1 15.0 1192 6.64 -0.77 0.05 -0.53 -0.82 0.53 
Ohio 10511 911 47.1 25.6 1933 3.91 -0.33 0.01 0.00 -0.34 0.00 
Oklahoma 2448 653 42.4 20.1 1539 4.97 -0.66 -0.10 -0.24 -0.57 0.24 
Oregon 5771 1,506 45.5 31.4 3311 3.18 0.17 -0.02 0.21 0.20 -0.21 
Pennsylvania 13415 1,056 48.3 24.8 2188 4.04 -0.18 0.03 -0.03 -0.21 0.03 
Rhode Island 1456 1,383 48.4 29.7 2860 3.37 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.05 -0.15 
South Carolina 4587 992 44.4 24.8 2236 4.04 -0.24 -0.05 -0.03 -0.19 0.03 
South Dakota 525 645 48.4 15.5 1334 6.43 -0.67 0.04 -0.49 -0.71 0.49 
Tennessee 5228 824 44.9 19.5 1837 5.13 -0.43 -0.04 -0.27 -0.39 0.27 
Texas 19885 791 43.7 19.9 1808 5.04 -0.47 -0.06 -0.25 -0.41 0.25 
Utah 3771 1,365 41.1 32.6 3324 3.07 0.08 -0.13 0.24 0.20 -0.24 
Vermont 660 1,054 50.8 24.4 2075 4.10 -0.18 0.09 -0.04 -0.27 0.04 
Virginia 15585 1,948 46.6 33.2 4179 3.01 0.43 0.00 0.26 0.43 -0.26 
Washington 12078 1,796 47.1 30.2 3811 3.31 0.35 0.01 0.17 0.34 -0.17 
West Virginia 956 516 42.3 15.0 1220 6.67 -0.90 -0.10 -0.53 -0.80 0.53 
Wisconsin 6260 1,101 48.2 29.3 2283 3.41 -0.14 0.03 0.14 -0.17 -0.14 
Wyoming 581 1,031 49.0 20.2 2102 4.94 -0.20 0.05 -0.23 -0.26 0.23 
U.S. 390728 1,266 46.6 25.5 2713 3.92 - - - - - 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
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4.  Visualization of Differences between States 
 
A simple way to visualize the results from the decomposition is to look at scatter plots of 
the parameter values obtained for various states as a function of a separate variable which is 
likely to be correlated with these parameter values. This is done in Figures 1 to 5 with the 
variable used for the horizontal axis being the average amount of taxes paid per inhabitant in a 
state (this in interesting for its own sake given a focus on taxes, but it is also to some extent a 
proxy for the average level of income in the state). Each state is represented by a dot on the 
Figures, but the District of Columbia, which will be discussed in more details for the illustration, 
is represented by a larger dot. The choice of the District of Columbia for the illustration stems 
from the fact that it appears to be an outlier when simply looking at the values in table 1 since it 
has the second highest mortgage interest deduction per person after Maryland. But on closer 
inspection, it is less of an outlier than one might think. To show this through simple 
visualizations, each scatter plot includes a logarithmic line (or curve) of best fit, which gives an 
indication of where a state is expected to be for a parameter value given its average level of taxes 
paid per person. There is of course quite a bit of variability across states, with the R-squared 
values for the curves of best fit ranging from 0.12 in Figure 5 to 0.50 in Figure 2.  But the results 
still provide some valuable intuition for discussing the parameters obtained for any given state. 
What story do the Figures tell in the case of the District of Columbia?  Figure 1 suggests 
visually that the District has both one of the highest levels of average taxes paid per person and 
one of the highest mortgage deductions per person nationally. Only one state has a higher level 
of taxes paid per person (Connecticut), and only one state has a higher level of mortgage 
deductions per person (Maryland, as already mentioned). At the same time, the District is about 
at the level of mortgage deductions that would be expected for a state with its level of taxes paid 
per person – this is illustrated by the fact that the District is near the line of best fit in the Figure. 
 
 
 
Source: Author based on data in table 1. 
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 The first factor or parameter in the decomposition of the average mortgage deduction per 
person is the share of the population that files a tax return. As shown in Figure 2, the District has 
the highest share of filers among all states, and this parameter value for the District appears to be 
an outlier given its level of average taxes paid per person. A reason for this may be the fact that 
the population of the District now tends to be relatively young, in part because after many years 
of population decline, the District has reversed its fortunes over the last decade, in part with a 
new influx of young and single professionals coming to work in the capital city.  This naturally 
leads to a larger share of the population not only earning incomes that warrant tax returns, but 
also a larger number of tax returns being filed by a relatively young population (for established 
families, the number of tax returns being filed might be smaller due to spouses filing jointly). 
 
 
 
Source: Author based on data in table 1. 
 
  
Next, Figure 3 visualizes the position of the District in terms of the share of filers who 
claim the mortgage deduction. For this parameter, the District seems again to be an outlier, but 
this time with a lower than expected parameter value, which may seem surprising given that as 
noted by Rivers (2013), the level of the standard deduction is low in the District, which should 
lead to more tax filers itemizing deductions. The low level of itemization for mortgage interest in 
the District is likely related to the peculiar nature of the District as city-state, that is an urban 
center with a higher concentration of rental properties as compared to properties owned by their 
occupant. The average price of apartments and single family homes is also relatively high in the 
District, which discourages ownership especially for the substantial part of the workforce that is 
transitory, and this applies especially for the younger and growing segment of the workforce 
living in the city. In effect, the higher than expected share of filers in the population (with 
expectations based on the average level of taxes paid per person), and the lower than expected 
share of filers claiming the mortgage deduction are related at least in part to similar 
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the region3 as well as a Homestead Deduction, but the impact of such policies cannot offset the 
larger impact of more fundamental demographic and housing market factors leading the 
mortgage deduction rate among tax filers in the District to be relatively low. 
 
 
 
Source: Author based on data in table 1. 
 
 
In Figure 4, which represents the third parameter in the decomposition (the average taxes 
paid by filers) the District is again located essentially on the line of best fit through the scatter 
plot.  By contrast, in Figure 5 the District seems to have a higher than expected ratio of the 
average mortgage interest deduction among claimants divided by the average taxes paid by filers. 
Given that ownership rates tend to be lower in a city environment like that of the District, and 
that the prices of apartments and homes is relatively high by national standards as mentioned 
earlier, ownership tends to be concentrated among residents with high income levels. This also 
implies that among claimants, the mortgage deductions are substantial (since home prices are 
high as well), leading to a higher than expected level, given the District’s average taxes per 
person, of the ratio of the deductions (among claimants) as a share of the taxes paid by filers. 
Overall then, the combination of the various factors is such that the level of the mortgage 
deductions per person observed in the District, while very high in comparison to the United 
States as a whole (see table 1), is about at the level expected given its average taxes per person. 
 
 
                                                          
3 As noted by the DC Fiscal Institute (Kerstetter, 2009), property tax rates are low in the District in comparison to 
neighboring jurisdictions. In 2008 for example, homeowners with a dwelling valued at $500,000 paid an average tax 
of $2,725 in the District, versus $3,504 in Montgomery County, $4,752 in Prince George County, and over $4,400 
in Arlington and Fairfax counties. This is in part because the homeowner property tax rate in the District is lower 
than in most neighboring counties, with the Homestead Deduction available in the District playing a role as well.  
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Source: Author based on data in table 1. 
 
 
Source: Author based on data in table 1. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The objective of this paper was to suggest a simple multiplicative decomposition that 
could help in comparing in a stylized way the levels of itemized tax deductions observed in 
different states or geographic areas. The decomposition highlights a number of key variables 
affecting the level of deductions, such as a state’s population, its number of tax filers, the share 
of filers claiming a specific deduction, the average taxes paid by filers, and the average 
deduction among claimants. Using federal tax as well as population data from 2010, the 
decomposition was applied to the mortgage interest tax deduction, one of the largest tax 
expenditure at the federal level in the United States. 
y = 1742.4ln(x) - 11363 
R² = 0.3475 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
A
ve
ra
ge
 T
ax
es
 P
au
id
 p
er
 F
ile
r 
Average Total Taxes Paid per Person 
Figure 4: Average Taxes Paid per Filer 
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Figure 5: Deduction as Share of Average Taxes Paid 
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The decomposition is purely descriptive and based on an accounting identity. Neither the 
decomposition, nor its graphical visualization as provided in this paper pretend to imply causality 
between variables. But it is hoped that using such simple decompositions as a preliminary basic 
diagnostic tool can be useful for states and local authorities to investigate some of the reasons 
why they may have comparatively high or low deductions, as well as whether the levels of 
various deductions are as one might have expected given their overall tax receipts. 
 
References 
Brady, P., J.-A. Cronin, and S. Houser, 2003, Regional Differences in the Utilization of the 
Mortgage Interest Deduction, Public Finance Review 31(4): 327–366. 
 
Cole, A. J., G. Gee, and N. Turner, 2011, The Distributional and Revenue Consequences of 
Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction, National Tax Journal 64 (4): 977–1000. 
 
Domenici, P., and A. Rivlin, 2010, Restoring America’s Future: Reviving the Economy, Cutting 
Spending and Debt, and Creating a Simple, Pro-Growth Tax System, Washington, DC: 
Bipartisan Policy Center. 
 
Follain, J., D. Ling, and G. McGill, 1993, The Preferential Income Tax Treatment of Owner 
Occupied Housing: Who Really Benefits?, Housing Policy Debate 4 (1): 1–24. 
 
Glaeser, E., and J. Shapiro, 2003, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, Tax 
Policy and the Economy 17: 37–82.  
 
Gravelle, J. G., and S. Lowry, 2013, Restrictions on Itemized Tax Deductions: Policy Options 
and Analysis, Report No. R43079, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
 
Gyourko, J., and T. Sinai, 2003, The Spatial Distribution of Housing-Related Ordinary Income 
Tax Benefits, Real Estate Economics 31(4): 527–575. 
 
Gyourko, J., and T. Sinai, 2004, The (Un)Changing Geographical Distribution of Housing Tax 
Benefits: 1980–2000, Tax Policy and the Economy 18: 175–208. 
 
Hanson, A., 2012, The Incidence of the Mortgage Interest Deduction: Evidence from the Market 
for Home Purchase Loans, Public Finance Review 40(3): 339-59. 
 
Hanson, A., 2012, Size of Home, Home Ownership, and the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 
Journal of Housing Economics 21(3), 195–210. 
 
Joint Committee on Taxation (Congressional Research Service), 2013, Estimates of Federal Tax 
Expenditures, For Fiscal Years 2012-2017, 113th Congress, 1st session, February 1, JCS-1-13, 
Washington: Government Printing Office.  
 
Juffras, J., 2013, Tax Expenditure Briefing to the D.C. Tax Revision Commission, Washington, 
DC: Office of Revenue Analysis of the District of Columbia. 
 13 
 
 
Kerstetter, K., 2009, DC Homeowners’ Property taxes Remain Lowest in the Region, 
Washington, DC: DC Fiscal Institute.  
 
Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013, The Geographic Distribution of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 
Washington, DC: Pew Charitable Trusts.  
 
Poterba, J., 1992, Taxation and Housing: Old Questions, New Answers, American Economic 
Review 82(2): 237–242. 
 
Poterba, J., and T. Sinai, 2011, Revenue Costs and Incentive Effects of the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction for Owner-Occupied Housing, National Tax Journal 64(2): 531-564. 
 
Ventry, D. J., 2010, The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for 
Mortgage Interest. Law and Contemporary Problems, 73(1): 233-84. 
 
Rivers, W., 2013, Increasing the District’s Personal Exemption and Standard Deduction Would 
Help Provide Greater Tax Relief to Low- and Moderate-Income DC Residents, Washington, DC: 
DC Fiscal Institute. 
 
Sullivan, M., 2011, Mortgage Deduction Heavily Favors Blue States, Tax Notes 130: 364–367. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
